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Abstract—Phishing emails are the first step for many of today’s
attacks. They come with a simple hyperlink, request for action
or a full replica of an existing service or website. The goal
is generally to trick the user to voluntarily give away his
sensitive information such as login credentials. Many approaches
and applications have been proposed and developed to catch
and filter phishing emails. However, the problem still lacks a
complete and comprehensive solution. In this paper, we apply
knowledge discovery principles from data cleansing, integration,
selection, aggregation, data mining to knowledge extraction. We
study the feature effectiveness based on Information Gain and
contribute two new features to the literature. We compare six
machine-learning approaches to detect phishing based on a small
number of carefully chosen features. We calculate false positives,
false negatives, mean absolute error, recall, precision and F-
measure and achieve very low false positive and negative rates.
Naı¨ve Bayes has the least true positives rate and overall Neural
Networks holds the most promise for accurate phishing detection
with accuracy of 99.4%.
Index Terms—phishing email, phishing detection, machine
learning, features selection
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing is a common type of attack to the extent that
almost every one of us receives several phishing emails a
week [1]. Phishing is an email based attack where the attacker
sends an email claiming to be from a legitimate source. The
phisher masquerades as a legitimate organization or figure
of authority by sending fake emails and requesting urgent
response or action. The ultimate goal is to lure the victims to
give away private or valuable information that could be used
for stealing personal data, identity theft and/or monetary gain
[2]. Phishing is a form of social engineering attacks that use
human good nature against them. Humans tend to act urgently
on a request from their helpdesk asking to click a link to
change their password or follow certain instructions to install a
new program. Attackers use social engineering techniques and
technical subterfuge to steal identity, account credentials, and
exploit both individual and corporate networks on the Internet.
Phishing has been the main vehicle for delivery of some of
the most serious attacks [3]. A very recent attack against banks
and financial institutions around the world that is claimed to
have costed billions of dollars in stolen money used a phishing
email as a starting point. Kaspersky reported that Carbanak
malware targeted bank employees with a specifically designed
spear phishing email to eventually install the backdoor [4].
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [5]
around 630,494 unique phishing sites were detected and 3,774
unique brands were targeted by phishing campaigns.
It is very easy to confuse phishing emails with legitimate
requests. As a matter of fact, the attackers go out of their way
to make their emails look legitimate by including logos and
believable wording. However, phishing emails do not all look
alike, because effective phishing emails are custom designed
for their intended targets. There are many variations and types
of phishing emails reported in the literature [6]. Researchers
have used catchy names, such as:
• Pharming: using Domain Name System (DNS) spoofing
to redirect the user to a fake website,
• Spear phishing: using information available to the attack-
ers to deliver a more individualized approach targeting
specific users,
• Whaling: going after wealthy individuals,
• Vishing: that is voice phishing, where the attacker calls
with a recorded message to trick the user to dial in his
private information [7].
Phishing emails have evolved and mutated into various
forms, some are easy to spot such as fig:1 and others such
as Figure 2 are well crafted to look legitimate. The phishing
email in Figure 1 preys on human greed, which might blind the
recipient to the fact that he/she might have never participated
or even heard of such lottery, let alone winning a US$2 million
prize. However, human greed for easy money tends to lure
the recipient to open the (.rtf) attachment that often contains a
macro, which will kick start the attack. The second phishing
email in Figure 2, is much better crafted to look like a harmless
transaction, however the attachment will probably download
and execute some sort of malware [8].
We cannot but help notice the effort the attackers put to
make the emails look benign and the redirection websites
look trustworthy. The emails are often sent from accounts
that look legit or that belong to a previous business associate
or a friend. The requests are well written to look believable,
nonetheless, you can notice a few identifying or suspicious
features such as: urgent request, existence of a hyperlink or
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Fig. 1. Easy to spot sample phishing email
attachment, inaccuracy of the content, and in some instances
the sender email is out right suspicious [9]. Despite the obvious
features of all the previous emails, the majority of average
users with low security awareness are susceptible to falling
for such schemes. Finally, phishing detection is a complex
process, which involves many factors and the parameters that
might be vague [10]. Hence, we argue that there is need for
a better approach towards phishing detection.
In this paper we study, compare and experiment with several
phishing identifying features. In addition, we compare several
top machine learning algorithms using real phishing emails
taken from a publicly available dataset [11]. The rest of this
article is organized as follows. Section II surveys the related
work in the literature. Section III presents the features selec-
tion, testing and metrics. Section IV explains the experimental
setup and discusses the results. Finally, section V lays out the
conclusions and directions for future work.
Fig. 2. Phishing email close to legitimate emails
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section explains the various forms of phishing emails,
email delivery process, phishing detection toolbars and the
most recent machine learning phishing detection techniques.
A. Phishing forms
Based on the techniques used to deliver attacks or steal
personal information, we divide the phishing attacks into the
following groups [12].
1) First group is link-based.
2) Second group is text-based, it relies only on appealing
to the recipients psyche in order to lure him to give away
the password.
3) Third group is image-based. The detection of this
group is more difficult because it combines images with
text as well as a link to the phishing website.
4) Fourth group is attachment-based. This category con-
tains malicious software in the form of benign looking
HTML files, documents or PDF attachments.
B. Recent works
Phishing detection toolbars are browser extensions that help
users detect phished websites such as Netcraft, SpoofGuard,
and CallingID [14]. This is a client side tool for phishing
detection. These methods might be rendered ineffective by
spoofing of the DNS cache entries and phishing website can
be purported as a legitimate one [15]. Another client side
technique is by the use of black and white lists, which are good
methods if the attack domains are fixed, and do not change
often. However, this is not true as Khonji et al. had stated
that 63% of phishing campaigns last only for two hours [16].
Therefore, we conclude that toolbars or blacklists would not
be effective against zero-day phishing attacks.
Machine Learning is a subdomain of Artificial Intelligence,
which uses data mining techniques and classification algo-
rithms. In classification type of problems we would train the
classifier with a training dataset to learn several features of
the input (variables or attributes) and associate those to the
appropriate class. Then the classifier is fed a new unclassified
dataset and it uses the learnt model to predict which class a
new record belongs to, that is, to classify an email as phishing
or not [18].
Chandreshekar [17] used a dataset of 400 emails of which 200
emails were phishing emails and a total of 25 features that
included a mixture of style markers and structural attributes
were extracted and classified using a one-class Support Vector
Machine (SVM). It can be seen that in the five runs of the
experiment the accuracy varied largely. That is because words
that are seen in phishing emails are added to the feature set
and that removing structural attributes from the training set
decreased accuracy by 20%. Moreover, the experiment base
used in the test is not large enough to draw a conclusion.
Abu-Nimeh [19] compared six classifiers accuracy and used
the phishing2.mbox provided by Nazario [11], where 43
features used to train and test the classifiers. The training and
testing included 10-fold cross validations, which are averaged.
They concluded that it’s difficult to select one classifier and
rather it is better to choose a classifier that best fits the research
problem. It was found that RF produces the best result with F-
Measure 90.24%, but at the same time, it has the highest false
positive rate of 8.29%. This is not appealing to users, as they
would not want a legitimate email to be classified as Spam
or phishing. In addition, LR showed high precision of 95%,
but also the highest number of false negatives of 17.04%. This
error might be due to the large number of features and could
be optimized by identifying the information gain per feature
variable.
Jabri and Ibrahim focused their attention on detecting phishing
websites using PRISM algorithm and induction rules. With
20 features and 1,000 test-cases they reported a modest 87%
accuracy with 0.1% error rate [20]. For a comprehensive study
and analysis of phished website detection techniques the reader
is referred to [21]
Mbah, Lashkari and Ghorbani [22] proposed Phishing Alerting
System (PHAS) to detect advertisement and pornographic
phishing emails. They used WEKA and two classification
algorithms: KNN and Decision Tree (J48). KNN achieved best
precision and recall of 93.4% 93.1%, respectively.
Smadi et al. [23] experimented with several classifiers to
determine the best algorithm for phsihing emails detection.
They achieved the highest accuracy, to date, of 98.87% with
Random Forest algorithm and using 23 features.
Finally and more recently, Abutair [24] used Case-Based
Reasoning (CBR) to detect phishing emails. They focused on
lightweight training with small datasets and limited number of
features. Their best reported accuracy was 95.62%.
We believe their is still more room for improvement in terms
of accuracy, especially with using smaller number of features
and small datasets to reduce processing times.
III. CLASSIFICATION APPROACH
Previous phishing detection techniques focused mostly on
classification and prediction. We benefit from Knowledge Dis-
covery process and apply data cleansing, integration, selection,
aggregation, data mining, pattern matching to better extract
knowledge. Our approach focuses mainly on content-based
feature extraction simply because it is simple and proven to
be highly effective in phishing detection. We use the public
available Nazario phishing corpus [11] as phishing dataset and
Spamassasins 20021010 easy ham.tar.bz2 corpus [25] as the
ham dataset.
A. Feature selection
Mbah, Lashkari and Ghorbani [22] surveyed the 20 most
commonly used features in the literature. IP URL was the
most frequently used feature, followed by dots number in
URL, hostname length and the existence of @ symbol. We
experiment with the top 20 as well as other feature we
handpicked by carefully observing and studying the features
in phishing dataset. We used Thunderbird email client to open
the emails and found that almost all the phishing emails
contain a URL to a malicious website. Most of the times URL
TABLE I
SELECTED FEATURE RANKED BY INFORMATION GAIN
Rank Feature IG
1 NoLinks 0.8490
2 capRatio 0.3923
3 NoLinksIP 0.2904
4 NoWords 0.2808
5 NoLinkMismatch 0.2743
6 NoPhishyWords 0.0674
7 isAtPresent 0.0580
8 NoLinkASCII 0.378
obfuscation methods were used to masquerade as a legitimate
website.
Based on calculating the Information Gain (IG), we ranked
all studied features. The following are the features we have
selected and used in our classifiers according to the IG scores
shown by Table I. The features fall into either body or URL
features.
1) Caps ratio (capRatio). The ratio of uppercase and low-
ercase letters.
2) Number of links (NoLinks) in the email [26].
3) Number of links that have IP addresses (NoLinksIP) as
domain name [27].
4) Number of links with the presence of ASCII characters
(NoLinkASCII) [28].
5) Presence of @ in the link (isAtPresent) [29].
6) Total number of words in email message (NoWords)
[30].
7) Number of Phishy words (NoPhishyWords). Words that
appear with high frequency in phishing emails, such as
money, bank, update, and verify, etc.
8) Href mismatch(NoLinkMismatch). Most common URL
obfuscation techniques where the visible link text
is different than the target such as <a>href=”real
link”>visible link</a> [17].
By using relatively few but prominent features, we were able
to detect phishing emails with 99.4% accuracy (see Section
IV). We also preferred the use of quantifying features than
binary as these features might hold more information. We
contribute two new features: capRatio and NoPhishyWords.
According to IG Table I, both features are very effective for
phishing detection.
B. Testing and evaluation metrics
For evaluation, we chose the commonly used metrics, which
are precision, recall, F-Measure and accuracy. In order to
compute these metrics, we need to define some terms that
make up the Confusion Matrix.
• True Positive (TP): Phishing email correctly classified as
a phishing.
• False Positive (FP): Ham email misclassified as a phish-
ing.
• False Negative (FN): Phishing email misclassified as ham.
• True Negative (TN): Ham email correctly classified as
ham.
C. Classification algorithms
We compare six well-known classification algorithms in-
cluded in WEKA (Waikato Environment for Knowledge Anal-
ysis). The classifiers include: Neural Networks [31], Rough
Set Theory [32], Naı¨ve Bayes, Support Vector Machines [33],
Random Forest [34] and Random Tree [35].
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section we explain how the features are extracted,
how the experiments were conducted and platform used.
The section goes on to present a thorough analysis of the
experimental results.
A. Experimental setup
The selected features were programmed in C# to create
a ”.arff” WEKA attribute file, which can be used as input
for the classification. The experiments were performed using
WEKA (Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis). For
our experiments, we used publicly available pre-classified
phishing datasets from Nazario dataset [11]. It includes 414
phishing messages. For the Ham we used 842 messages from
Apache SpamAssassin [25]. Experiments were conducted with
six different types of classification algorithms {Neural network
(NN),Rough set (RS), The Naı¨ve Bayes (NB), SVM, Random
Forest (RF) and Random Trees (RT)} to identify which method
performs the best.
The experiments use the eight attributes discussed earlier
and perform 10-fold-cross-validation. Cross validation approx-
imates unbiased error estimates by dividing the data into k-
subsets. One subset is used for testing and the remaining k−1
are used for training. This process is repeated using each of
the k subsets as test data and the results are averaged [15].
B. Experimental results
Figure 3 shows precision calculated for all algorithms. All
algorithms performed very well, however, NN and SVM came
out on top with precision of 99.76% and 99.74%, respectively.
Precision represents positive predictive power, that is how
many phishing emails we caught out of all available phishing
emails. However, it does not consider our ham prediction
capabilities.
Table II shows the recall for all algorithms, where NN, RS
and RF had the highest recall of 98.55%. Recall, also referred
to as sensitivity or true positive rate, represents the percentage
of phishing emails that the filter manages to block. Despite
RS and RF high recall, they had the worst and second worst
precision, respectively.
F-Measure is shown by Table II, which combines the
information from the last two measures (precision and recall)
through calculating the mean with equal weight for both
measures. Neural Networks had the best F-Measure of 99.15%,
which represents NN prediction effectiveness as opposed to the
other classifiers.
Fig. 3. Precision
TABLE II
CLASSIFIERS PERFORMANCE (%)
Classifier Precision Recall F-Measure Accuracy FPR
NN 99.76 98.55 99.15 99.44 0.119
SVM 99.75 97.83 98.78 99.21 0.119
NB 98.52 96.62 97.56 98.41 0.712
RS 98.08 98.55 98 .31 98.89 0.949
RF 98.55 98.55 98.55 99.05 0.712
RT 98.31 98.31 98.31 98.89 0.830
In addition, Table II shows that NN had the best overall ac-
curacy of 99.44% among all algorithms. Accuracy is the most
accurate measure of prediction power, where it represents the
percentage of all correctly classified phishing and ham emails
out of all emails. Despite a slight increase in classification
time NN has proved to be the best fit for phishing detection.
Moreover, Table II shows the False Positives Rate (FPR =
FP/(FP + TN)). FPR or fall-out ratio represents the prob-
ability of falsely classifying regular emails as phishing or
ham emails, which is another measure for accuracy of the
classifier. Neural Network as well as SVM exhibited the
smallest percentage of FPR at 0.119%.
Finally, the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) was computed.
MAE measures the average magnitude of the errors in a set
of forecasts, without considering their class. Support vector
machines had the least MAE of 0.8%, while NN had the
second highest MAE of 1.5%. Nonetheless, all MAE values
are relatively small and acceptable given the high TPR.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Phishing features from the literature and new ones were
proposed. the most effective features according to Information
Gain were selected. We contributed two new and effective
features: capRatio ranked second among all features with IG
of 0.39 and and NoPhishyWords with IG of 0.07. Finally, we
compared the predictive capability of various classifiers. We
identified Neural Networks to be the best classifier for phishing
emails detection with overall accuracy of 99.4%. However,
Neural Networks caused a slight but noticeable degradation in
classification performance and had a significant MAE rate of
1.5%.
Future work includes adding more features such as Docu-
ment Frequency (DF) and Inverse Document Frequency (IDF)
[37]. We plan to extend our previous work on Multi-classifier
system using word embeddings [36] to better find unknown
phishing forms.
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